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“Historically, the great strength of the U.S. economic and political
system has been its ability, in the face of scandal, to reform and
heal itself. Indeed, we have often needed scandals to trigger
reform.”1
“Regulators have power to reduce excessive risk taking and broad
powers to order remedies concerning risk-taking innovation.
Financial regulators hold broad power to determine legal
violations in the financial sector.”2
*
Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee
College of Law; A.B. 1982, Brown University; J.D. 1985, New York University
School of Law.
1. Harvey J. Goldschmid, The SEC at 70: Let’s Celebrate Its Reinvigorated
Golden Years, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 825 (2005).
2. Kristin Johnson et al., Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd–Frank
Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795,
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“[T]he SEC routinely exercises its regulatory power to achieve
superior compliance, risk management, and corporate governance
in wayward registrants and regulated entities.”3
I. Diversity in Governance Matters: A Herculean and Worthy
Undertaking
The global financial crisis of 2007–2009 predictably catalyzed
a federal legislative and regulatory response.4 In some respects,
that response afforded federal agencies new regulatory authority;
in other respects, that response employed existing agency
authority in new ways. Regardless, the regulatory process may
have frustrated—or at least not have given full effect to—
congressional intent or authorization, with the possible result
that (for this and other reasons) the causes of the financial crisis
may not have been completely addressed. However, financial
regulators may yet pave the way forward.
In Diversifying to Mitigate Risk,5 Professors Kristin Johnson,
Steven A. Ramirez, and Cary Martin Shelby suggest a
non-obvious path to a more stable national financial future. The
article takes on an enormous task relevant to financial regulatory
reform arising out of the financial crisis. That task ultimately
involves harnessing and channeling federal financial regulatory
authority to manage financial market risk. The issue and line of
attack are well known. Yet, comprehensive, realizable solutions
have been elusive.
The approach of these authors is innovative and focuses on
integrating issues of market risk with literature promoting
diversity in firm governance. In Diversifying to Mitigate Risk, the
authors first demonstrate that diversity in financial firm
governance is important as a risk management device.6 That, in
and of itself, is a tall order. However, the authors do not stop
there. They then proceed to contend that Congress intended in
passing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
1851 (2016).
3. See id. at 1865 (describing the response).
4. Id. at 1796.
5. Id. at 1795.
6. Id. at 1840–51.
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Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd–Frank)7 to delegate to financial
regulators the task of employing diversity as a risk management
device through the mandate in Section 342(b)(2)(C) of
Dodd-Frank (Section 342).8 More specifically, they argue that
Section 342 requires financial regulators to evaluate “the
diversity policies and practices”9 of regulated entities rather than
allowing firms to self-assess these policies and practices under
regulatory guidelines. Because federal financial regulators chose
the self-regulation route, the authors conclude that federal
regulators have not complied adequately with Congress’s Section
342 mandate.
[T]he diversity initiative embodied in Section 342 . . . holds the
promise of enhanced financial performance as well as risk
mitigation. In fact . . . powerful evidence suggests that
diversity particularly leads to superior risk management
during periods of financial turbulence such as the financial
crisis. . . . Unfortunately, . . . the financial regulators ignored
this lesson and materially diluted the impact of the statutory
provision.10

As the authors note in the article, a former commissioner of the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Louis Aguilar,
shares their concern.11
Overall, the argument in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk is
well-documented (offering valuable citations to supporting
literature) and thorough. As someone who has written about the
merits of gender and other diversity based on matters of trust12
and crowd theory,13 much of what the article says about the value
of diversity in business governance decision-making resonates
7. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–03),
https://www.sec.gov/about/laws/wallstreet reform-cpa.pdf.
8. See id. § 342(b)(2)(C).
9. Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1803.
10. Id. at 1838–39 (footnotes omitted).
11. See id. at 1839 n.219.
12. See generally, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and Corporate
Boards, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 173 (2007).
13. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Women in the Crowd of
Corporate Directors: Following, Walking Alone, and Meaningfully Contributing,
21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 59 (2014) (explaining crowd theory particularly
as it relates to women in corporate governance).
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with me. Moreover, I find the article’s linkage of diversity and
market risk to Section 342’s mandate both creative and
provocative, even if the authors’ precise expressed prescription as
to the use of the SEC’s regulatory authority is, as yet, only
generally articulated in the article.
I do, however, have several relatively narrowly drawn
critiques of the portion of the article in which the authors make
assertions about the broad scope of financial regulatory authority
that enables financial regulators to use diversity more directly as
a risk-management tool. As a general matter, the authors argue
that “[r]egulators have power to reduce excessive risk taking and
broad powers to order remedies concerning risk-taking
innovation. Financial regulators hold broad power to determine
legal violations in the financial sector.”14 I agree with the general
contention, but in general, I am concerned that it is not
effectively defended. Specifically, the article offers supportive
examples from banking and securities regulation. Securities
regulation is my primary area of practice and a body of rules
about which I frequently write. Accordingly, my comments relate
to the observations made in the article about the regulatory
authority of the SEC under U.S. federal securities regulation.
My appraisal of the authors’ treatment of SEC authority in
Diversifying to Mitigate Risk proceeds in two principal
substantive parts. First, in Part II, I address the absence of clear
articulations in the article of the policies underlying and tools of
regulation under the two most salient federal securities laws.
Then, in Part III, I note that one of the examples provided by the
authors in the prescriptive part of Diversifying to Mitigate Risk
invokes two additional federal securities laws with different
underlying policies and operative regulatory tools that also
should be, but have not been, explored by the authors. Finally, I
offer a brief conclusion.
To be clear at the outset, none of the critique offered in this
response to Diversifying to Mitigate Risk goes to the heart of the
authors’ thesis. Moreover, their work in this article is both
important and useful. My ultimate objective in undertaking this
commentary is to offer additional support for the authors’
argument.
14.

Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1851.
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II. Missed Opportunities: Policies and Tools under the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act
As a securities lawyer and erstwhile student of institutional
reform at the SEC,15 I admit to some disappointment with the
level of analysis afforded to policy and related regulatory tools in
the article’s suggested securities regulation response. That
response comes late in the piece (in the last eight pages of the
article, under the subsection heading “The SEC and the
Securities Industry”)16 and fails to sufficiently address what I
consider to be the core values—policies and regulatory tools—of
securities regulation under the two key federal laws governing
securities offerings and trading: the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended (the 1933 Act),17 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, as amended (the 1934 Act).18 “These acts and the
Commission itself remain the fundamental foundations that
make our securities regulation system work today.”19
The authors begin this important part of their article—
concluding with prescriptions for the use of the SEC’s vast
regulatory authority—with a weak premise. Specifically, they
assert that “[t]he SEC’s main concern is legal compliance and
regulatory risk.”20 The limited support provided for this
statement in the appended footnote, which refers to a “Fast
Answers” page from the SEC’s website that addresses only the
1933 Act (from which no examples are drawn in this part of the
article), is inadequate to the introductory function it is intended
to serve.
It would be appropriate to begin this portion of the article
with a brief recitation of the nature and broad-based statutory
15. See generally, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sustaining Reform
Efforts at the SEC: A Progress Report, 30 BANKING & FIN. SVCS. POL’Y REP. 1
(Apr. 2011) (describing and evaluating the progress of SEC reforms efforts);
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Reframing and Reforming the Securities and
Exchange Commission: Lessons from Literature on Change Leadership, 55
VILLANOVA L. REV. 627 (2010) (assessing SEC reform efforts through the lens of
change leadership).
16. Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1860–67.
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77z-3 (2012).
18. Id. §§ 78a–78qq.
19. Goldschmid, supra note 1, at 826.
20. Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1860.
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authority of the SEC. The SEC was established in Section 4 of the
1934 Act as an independent federal agency.21 The broad scope of
the SEC’s authority over federal securities regulation is
evidenced by the many congressional enactments that reference
the obligations or permissive powers. These include, for example,
the general
power to make such rules and regulations as may be necessary
or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter [the
1934 Act] for which they are responsible or for the execution of
the functions vested in them by this chapter, and may for such
purposes classify persons, securities, transactions, statements,
applications, reports, and other matters within their
respective jurisdictions, and prescribe greater, lesser, or
different requirements for different classes thereof.22

This general statutory foundation for the SEC’s authority to
regulate establish provides a strong underpinning for the
argument in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk that the SEC can police
board diversity in regulated entities.
Other relevant general manifestations in the 1934 Act of the
wide-ranging authority of the SEC include those in Sections 21
and 22 regarding the conduct of investigations, enforcement
actions, and hearings.23 Although perhaps less relevant to this
article, the SEC’s general authority to “conditionally or
unconditionally exempt any person, security, or transaction, or
any class or classes of persons, securities, or transactions, from
any provision or provisions of this chapter [the 1934 Act] or of
any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that such
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and
is consistent with the protection of investors”24 is a further
indication of the breadth and depth of its statutory powers. The
SEC has similarly broad authority to regulate offers and sales of
securities under the 1933 Act.25 Successful challenges to the
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
22. Id. § 78w.
23. See id. §§ 78u & 78v.
24. Id. § 78mm.
25. See, e.g., id. § 77s (general rulemaking authority); id. § 77t
(investigations, injunctions, prosecutions, and other enforcement authority); id.
§ 77u (authority to hold hearings); id. § 77z-3 (general authority over
exemptions).
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SEC’s authority under these provisions have been relatively
rare.26
The authors also could have laid a more robust foundation for
their recommendations by establishing and offering citational
support for the general tools of federal securities regulation under
the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act and the regulatory policies these
tools serve. I have collected and acknowledged these tools and
policies in prior work:
[M]andatory disclosure has been and continues to be a key
regulatory tool in U.S. securities regulation. Along with the
prevention of fraud and other misleading conduct and the
substantive regulation of market participants, disclosure
mandates under securities laws and rules . . . serve to protect
investors, maintain the integrity of securities markets, and
encourage capital formation. These are the core policy
objectives of securities regulation.27

As Diversifying to Mitigate Risk argues, direct SEC efforts to
ensure diversity in financial firm governance constitute
substantive regulation geared to safeguard investors, ensure fair
markets, and foster the development of capital.
The breadth and depth of the SEC’s authority to regulate
broker-dealers and other financial intermediaries, the central
examples used by the authors in this part of the article, are
amply supported by the general and specific statements of
statutory authority in the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act and the
three articulated core policy objectives underlying U.S. federal
securities regulation. Moreover, the SEC’s authority to revoke the
registration of broker-dealers is a specific manifestation of
substantive regulation. From a stronger statutory, regulatory,
and policy foundation, the article can better proceed with its
examples of the SEC’s exceptional power to both “give” and “take
26. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Am.
Equity Inv. Life Ins. Co. v. SEC, 613 F.3d 166, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Chamber of
Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 412 F.3d 133, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Bus. Roundtable
v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
27. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Investor and Market Protection in the
Crowdfunding Era: Disclosing to and for the “Crowd”, 38 VT. L. REV. 827, 828
(2014) (footnotes omitted); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, What Is a Security
in the Crowdfunding Era?, 7 OHIO ST. ENTREP. BUS. L.J. 335, 337–41, 345 (2012)
(offering a general overview of the purposes of security regulation in the United
States).
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away” as gatekeepers of the very existence and scope of activities
of regulated financial firms and its specific illustrations of “the
power of the federal financial regulators over the internal
governance of firms they regulate.”28
III. Distinctions with a Difference: The Regulation of Investment
Advisers and Investment Companies
The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act are only two of the six federal
securities laws adopted in response to the 1929 stock market
crash.29 A seventh act was enacted in 1970.30 The SEC enjoys
regulatory authority under all seven federal securities laws.31 The
1933 Act and 1934 Act, taken alone, do not provide a sufficient
foundation for all of the examples offered by the authors as
illustrations of the breadth and depth of the SEC’s regulatory
authority. But the seven acts taken as a whole support the
authors’ contentions.
Specifically, the Putnam Investment Management LLC
settlement referenced in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk exemplifies
the SEC’s authority under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,
as amended (the Investment Advisers Act),32 and the Investment
Company Act of 1940, as amended (the Investment Company
Act).33 As with the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, the Investment
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act establish the
scope of the SEC’s overall authority in multiple sections.34
Moreover, these two additional securities laws have, their own,
unique policy underpinnings and use distinctive regulatory tools
28. Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1862.
29. See Joel Seligman, Key Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act for
Independent Regulatory Agencies, 89 WASH. U.L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (“The New
Deal’s six federal securities laws were a response to the 1929-1933 stock market
crash.”).
30. Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and
Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 450 n.2 (2002).
31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012).
33. Id. §§ 80a-1–80a-64.
34. See, e.g., id. § 80b-9 (enforcement authority); id. § 80b-11 (rulemaking
authority); id. § 80a-37 (rulemaking authority); id. § 80a-41 (enforcement
authority).
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that are largely unexplored in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk as
foundations for the authors arguments about the scope of the
SEC’s authority to regulate the internal governance of financial
institutions.
For example, “[t]he policy of the Investment Advisers Act is
to protect investors from potential ‘malpractices’ on the part of
investment advisers.”35 More expansively:
The Investment Advisers Act essentially reflects a
congressional recognition of the delicate fiduciary nature of an
investment advisory relationship, as well as an intent to
eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest that
might
induce
investment
advisers,
consciously
or
unconsciously, to render advice that was not disinterested. The
Investment Advisers Act clearly was enacted for the protection
of investors and was intended to promote full and accurate
disclosure of all material facts by investment advisers. In
summary, the Investment Advisers Act imposes a fiduciary
duty upon investment advisers when dealing with their clients
and prohibits them from violating this duty by engaging in
fraudulent and deceitful practices.36

This investor protection focus, implemented primarily
through disclosure, is shared with securities regulation under the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Yet, other policies and tools of
regulation under the Investment Advisers Act, enacted more than
six years after adoption of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act,
emanate from perceived gaps in the then existing regulatory
framework and rely on distinct observations about the role of
investment advisers in financial markets and the economy as a
whole.37 The contextual origins of and policies underlying the
35. Dean L. Bussey, Securities Regulation-Performance Fees Under the
Investment Advisers Act: The Inadequacy of Disclosure Provisions, 11 J. CORP. L.
457, 459 (1986).
36. Id. at 460 (footnotes omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-4 (setting forth
reporting responsibilities); id. § 80b-4a (requiring policies and procedures to
prevent the misuse of nonpublic information); id. § 80b-7 (making willful
material misstatements and willful misleading material omissions unlawful).
37. See, e.g., Steven L. Jones, Custodial Collies of Transparency—the
Competitive Advantage of Protecting Investing Lamm(Bs) from Advising Wolves:
Lamm v. State Street Bank & Trust, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1119, 1128 (2015) (“The
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 . . . was a Congressional effort . . . to prevent
and eradicate fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative practices by investment
advisers.”); Elliot J. Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the
Williams Act’s Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1098
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Investment Advisers Act, as well as its disclosure mandates and
additional regulatory tools, may or may not ultimately impact the
authors’ argument about the SEC’s authority to regulate the
internal governance of investment advisers. Regardless, the
absence of any analysis is conspicuous.
Similarly, the Investment Company Act occupies an
overlapping, yet distinct, regulatory space as among the U.S.
federal securities laws. The distinctions provide an opportunity
for significantly clearer and more pointed observations than one
can easily make with respect to the Investment Advisers Act. The
Investment Company Act “regulates the activities of investment
companies both in offering securities to investors and in its
governance and investment activities.”38 The act itself expressly
regulates the internal governance of registered investment
companies in a number of ways.39
[T]he Investment Company Act places its principal reliance on
independent directors, rather than on direct shareholder
democracy or administrative agency oversight. Not only does
the Act require that forty percent of a fund’s board be
composed of independent outside directors (and in some
circumstances dictate that a majority be independent), but it
assigns specific duties to these independent directors and thus
takes them away from the discretion of the board as a whole.40

Arguably,
the
Investment
Company
Act’s
policy
underpinnings and its express statutory regulation of investment
company internal governance provide more direct support for the
authors’ contention in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk that the
n.69 (1982) (“[T]he Investment Advisers Act . . . establishes a fiduciary
relationship between investment advisers and their clients”).
38. Joseph A. Franco, The Investment Company Act’s Definition of
“Security” and the Myth of Equivalence, 7 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 37 (2001).
39. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10 (addressing director independence); id. §
80a-16 (setting forth requirements for the election of investment company
directors); id. § 80a-55 (regulating board composition based on affiliation and
other interests).
40. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation
and A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 288 (1981)
(footnotes omitted); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1(b) (offering an express, relatively
detailed, general statutory statement of policy listing adverse effects on “the
national public interest and the interest of investors”); id. 80a-10 (addressing, as
indicated by its title, “[a]ffiliations or interest of directors, officers, and
employees”).
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SEC’s overall regulatory authority permits it to control the
internal affairs of the firms it regulates. “[T]he Investment
Company Act of 1940 established a strong corporate governance
framework for investment companies from the very beginning.”41
On the other hand, one might be able to argue that the express
statutory provision of internal governance rules in the
Investment Company Act militates against the implied existence
of broad SEC regulatory authority over matters of internal
governance elsewhere in the Investment Company Act or under
other federal securities laws.
These matters under the Investment Advisers Act and the
Investment Company Act beg for analysis. The Investment
Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act have distinct
statutory provisions, and they were proposed for adoption to
address concerns different from those to which the provisions of
1933 Act and the 1934 Act are directed. The statutes rest on
different policy foundations and use different regulatory tools.
While the existence of differences in regulatory authority over
different financial intermediaries is explicitly recognized in
Diversifying to Mitigate Risk,42 the implications of those
differences are not fully addressed. At a minimum, the unique
position of Investment Company Act regulation merits special
treatment as a statutory basis for regulatory incursions into firm
governance.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, I have significant praise for the scope and overall
argument of Diversifying to Mitigate Risk. However, I find the
article’s analysis of the SEC’s capacity to regulate internal
governance to be lacking in depth and specificity. Optimally, the
authors of Diversifying to Mitigate Risk would have more clearly
41. Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The Fund Director in
2016: Keynote Address at the Mutual Fund Directors Forum 2016 Policy
Conference (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/chair-whitemutual-fund-directors-forum-3-29-16.html (last visited May 1, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. See Johnson et al., supra note 2, at 1863 (“The SEC regulatory scheme
with respect to each of these different types of financial institutions differs in
important ways.”).
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and individually articulated the statutory bases for the SEC’s
authority to regulate financial services firms under relevant
statutes, the policies underlying the SEC’s regulation of specific
financial institutions, and the tools employed in those regulatory
schemes. Clear, individual articulations would provide more
concrete support for the authors’ claim that the SEC’s authority
is broad enough to encompass the management of the internal
governance structures and attributes of regulated entities
Nevertheless, my criticisms regarding the substantiation of
broad-based SEC authority in Diversifying to Mitigate Risk do not
take away in any substantial respect from the general point made
by the authors that the SEC’s broad authority to register and
revoke the registration of financial intermediaries, read together
with Section 342, affords the SEC the power to engage in
assessments of the diversity policies and practices of the firms it
regulates. They argue from this point and from the literature on
governance diversity that, in the wake of a global financial crisis
in which non-diverse financial institutions played leading roles,
the authority of financial regulators, including the SEC, should
be used to manage risk by managing diversity in the governance
of regulated entities. They are motivated in large part by their
conclusion that “[a] more diverse financial sector is bound to
allocate capital better, achieve greater systemic stability, and
meet the public’s expectations of the financial sector.”43 That
conclusion is supported by the overall weight of authority
presented in the article and provides a basis for hope that
financial regulators can help the U.S. economic system reform
itself by better mitigating risk. Let’s hope that the regulators
accept the challenge and that these authors are correct.

43.

Id. at 1868.

